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Abstract
We examine the influence of corruption and regulatory environment on the home country 
entrepreneurship level. Using data from 54 countries from 2005 to 2011, we find that cor-
ruption does not have a consistent negative influence on home country nascent interna-
tional entrepreneurship. With regards to regulations, administrative regulations have differ-
ent influence than regulations that have financial implications. Tax related regulations do 
not have any significant influence in high corrupt countries. The results of our study also 
show that regulation and corruption interact uniquely with nascent internationals in the 
home country. The results of our study hold several robustness checks.
Keywords International entrepreneurship · Regulation · Tax · Export · Corruption
JEL Classification H0 · M13 · M16
1 Introduction
Corruption has long been associated with poor economic activity (Aghion et al. 2004; Ales-
ina et al. 2003; Tanzi and Davoodi 2001) and sometimes has been called ‘cancer’ in society.1 
Despite the negative influence of corruption on economic activity, it is prevalent in many 
countries around the world and is an indicator of the institutional environment in a coun-
try. The Institutional environment has long been of great interest in both entrepreneurship 
(Chowdhury et al. 2019; Estrin et al. 2013; McMullen et al. 2008) and international busi-
ness theory (Cuervo-Cazurra 2008; Cantwell et  al. 2010) since home country institutional 
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environment influences both firms’ and entrepreneurs’ decisions and behavior (Dunning 
and Lundan 2008; North 1990). The home country’s institutional environment can be very 
important for the nascent international entrepreneurs since they are faced with the tasks of 
confronting both the home and host country institutions (Autio et al. 2011; Dimitratos et al. 
2012).
Much of the research concerned with IEs has focused on firm performance (Lu and 
Beamish 2006) e.g., returns on assets and sales (Zahra and Garvis 2000), profits (Qian 
2002) or survival (Westhead et al. 2001), export share or export intensity (Fernández and 
Nieto 2006; Lockett et al. 2008), host country’s characteristics such as development level, 
institutions, political environment, economic openness, etc. and their influence on MNC’s 
internationalization (Meyer et al. 2009). An important gap remains in the literature is how 
the home country institutional environment affects nascent international entrepreneurs in 
the home country (Yamakawa et  al. 2013). To fill this important gap in the literature we 
address the following question in this article: Do corruption and regulatory environment of 
the home country influence the level of home country nascent international entrepreneur-
ship? How do regulatory institutions and corruption interact with each other to influence 
the level of home country nascent international entrepreneurship (IE)? By addressing these 
questions, we hope to better understand and recognize that perhaps costs associated with 
corruption is not monotonic and identify other factors that may influence the cost associated 
with corruption.
The growing scholarly literature on international entrepreneurship (IE) is concerned with 
entrepreneurial activity across national borders and its key influencers (Yamakawa et  al. 
2013; Westhead et al. 2001). In this article, we view nascent IE as the percentage of early-
stage entrepreneurs who have customers abroad. Corruption can be an important component 
for the nascent international entrepreneurship. Navigating institutional context can present a 
challenge and an opportunity for nascent home country international entrepreneurs. While 
established international firms also face the same situation, they have more country-specific 
advantages along with the firm-specific advantage (Erramilli et al. 1997).
The regulatory environment is important to consider since regulations not only can pro-
tect entrepreneurial investment (Johnson et al. 2002) but also be a burden on the nascent 
entrepreneurs (Grilo and Thurik 2005). Extensive regulations have often been cited as rea-
sons for inefficiency and ineffectiveness and lower performance (Bowen and De Clercq 
2008).
We contribute to the entrepreneurship and institutions literature by demonstrating that the 
nature of the institutional environment explains the level of nascent IEs in a country. To test 
the hypotheses of this paper, we combine both the institutional theory and public choice the-
ory. We test our measure and hypotheses in a global setting by using a sample of 54 coun-
tries. Our insights compliments and extend previous studies exploring the interaction between 
regulations and corruption, underscoring the importance of both regulatory environment and 
level of corruption. Our findings also provide depth to our understanding of the institutional 
environment can to influence IE. If the public policy goal is to promote international oriented 
entrepreneurial activity in a country, regulations that require financial resources can be prob-
lematic where corruption is also high.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, we present and 
hypothesize on the links between institutional quality, formal institutions, and IE. In the third 
section, we describe the variables and methodology. The results of our study are presented 
next, followed by conclusions and a discussion.
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2  Theory and hypothesis development
2.1  Relationship between Institutions and public choice
Nascent international entrepreneurs are a unique group and have an interesting relationship 
with the institutional environment. Institutions play an important role in economic activity 
by establishing the ‘rules of the game’ in a society. The rule of the game not only applies 
to human actions it also influences a firm’s behavior by facilitating or constraining certain 
activity. North (1991, p. 97) defined institutions as “humanly devised constraints that struc-
ture political, economic and social interaction” while Scott’s (2014, p. 56) definition of 
an institution is “regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements that together with 
associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life”. Institu-
tions are composed of both formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions are the 
written regulations and laws supported and enforced by political structures and regulatory 
bodies (North 1990; Williamson 2000) they are openly codified, established and communi-
cated by official laws and rules (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Informal institutions represent 
non-codified rules which can include cultural and social norms (e.g. corruption) (Baumol 
1990; North 1990). Both the formal and informal institutions have influence entrepreneurs’ 
thereby firms’ strategic choices (Williamson 2000; Peng et al. 2009). Coyne (2008) defines 
informal institutions as “… not formally mandated but coexists with formal institutions 
such as constitutions and written laws” (p. 23). Other scholars have viewed informal insti-
tutions as “the old ethos, the hand of the past or the carriers of history” (Pejovich 1999, p. 
166) and “have never been consciously designed” (Sugden 1986, p. 54).
Stigler (1971) argued that incumbent firms often promote regulations that serve their 
interests “… regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily 
for its benefits” (p. 3). Regulations are established by the existing firms/industry in coop-
eration with the government authority may be more beneficial for the incumbent firms than 
the nascent international entrepreneurs. Nascent international entrepreneurs in a home 
country have to follow the established rules and regulations that may put them at a disad-
vantage. By engaging in the international activity nascent international entrepreneurs can 
engage in regulatory arbitrage thereby reducing their reliance and uncertainty associated 
with home country’s weak institutional environment (Berger et al. 2000, Kane 2000, 2009, 
Carbo et al. 2008).
2.2  Institutions and international entrepreneurship
The entrepreneurial activity entails an individual’s willingness and capability to pursue 
the opportunity (McMullen and Shepherd 2006). Expanding to a foreign market presents 
home country nascent entrepreneurs with an opportunity to grow (Autio et al. 2000; Fila-
totchev and Piesse 2009; Schwens et al. 2017) while it can also be challenging for them 
and institutional environment can be an important consideration. Entrepreneurs set-up 
their organization as well as formulate and modify their strategies and actions based on the 
environment, they are situated in. It is especially important for international entrepreneurs 
since they have to adapt “…. firm’s operations (strategy, structure, and resource, etc.) to 
environments” (Calof and Beamish 1995, p. 116) to both home and foreign market envi-
ronment. Home country nascent entrepreneurs modify their behavior, decisions, and strate-
gic responses based on the institutional environment of both places (DiMaggio and Powell 
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1983; Scott 2001). These institutions are crucial for reducing uncertainty along with risk 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Martens et al. 2007), and entrepreneurial activity (Baumol 
and Strom 2007; Boettke and Coyne 2003).
2.3  Linking corruption to nascent international entrepreneurship in home country
Corruption is an indicator of poor-quality institutions (Tanzi 1998). In many of the emerg-
ing and developing economies corruption is so pervasive that it becomes a “norm2” in 
those countries (Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti 2017;  Li et  al. 2008; Rodriguez et  al. 
2005). There is no consistent definition of corruption and hard to define; some defined cor-
ruption as the use of public office for private gain (Rose-Ackerman 1999, 2007; Treisman 
2000) others define corruption as the unwritten rules and norms that regulate interactions 
between government officials and clients (Mo 2001; Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Rodriguez 
et al. 2006). Existing literature shows the conflicting relationship between corruption and 
entrepreneurship. While corruption has largely been associated with negative effects on 
economic activity (Glaeser and Saks 2006; Treisman 2000; La Porta et al. 1999; Shleifer 
and Vishny 1993) and entrepreneurship (Anokhin and Schulze 2009; Bowen and De Clercq 
2008) others show a positive relationship (Méon and Weill 2010; Méon and Sekkat 2005).
Nascent international entrepreneurs are situated in a highly corrupt country can either 
comply with the poor-quality institutions by continuing to pay bribes or to search for alter-
natives. Existing research suggests that there are five ways that firms respond to their insti-
tutional environment—acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation 
(Oliver 1991). For the nascent international entrepreneurs, avoidance may be more ben-
eficial than the other options since all the other options include either diverting financial 
resources willingly or taking risks of diverting resources. Defiance could be detrimental 
since it may result in loss of legitimacy (Oliver 1991) and the ability to attract resources 
since they are more resources constrained than the established firms (Boddewyn and 
Brewer 1994; Keefer 1996). Avoidance is associated with “noncompliance”, “evasion of 
outside scrutiny”, or “escape from the institutional field”, is a way for the international 
entrepreneurs to avoid the poor-quality institutions in the home country (Witt and Lewin 
2007). Both acquiescence and manipulation, involve the use of firm resources thereby 
increasing cost but might be the best option for the nascent entrepreneurs. Acquiescence is 
accepting the existence of the poor-quality institution along with the costs associated with 
it while manipulation also involves using firms’ resources to influence the existing insti-
tutional environment. While international entrepreneurs have to divert resources that are 
necessary for the early stage of the venture, they might also be able to use their community 
networks to negotiate with the government officials. Therefore, combinational of acqui-
escence and manipulation are the best options for the nascent home country international 
entrepreneurs.
Nascent international entrepreneurs can use corruption to their advantage to acquire 
resources or avoid cumbersome regulations by using their internal resources such as home 
country networks, local knowledge, etc. (Yiu et al. 2007). These entrepreneurs have both 
tangible and intangible resources. For the nascent international entrepreneurs situated 
2 Normative institutions generally take the form of rule of thumb, occupational standards etc. (Scott 2001) 
and defined as the “rules of procedures that actors employ flexibly and reflexively to assure themselves and 
those around them that their behavior is reasonable” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p. 20).
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in corrupt countries, intangible resources might be very valuable. Intangible resources 
include home country knowledge and network ties. Network ties can be institutional or 
business ties and both can be used by the home country international entrepreneurs for 
their advantage (Yiu et al. 2007). Therefore, we hypothesize that
Hypothesis 1 Home country corruption is positively associated with home country nas-
cent international entrepreneurship.
2.4  Regulatory institutions and nascent international entrepreneurship
The regulatory environment represents a set of formal institutions in a country, codified, 
official and play a large role in shaping the environment (Zahra and Garvis 2000; North 
1990; Bowen and De Clercq 2008). Regulations and nascent IE have an intertwining rela-
tionship. An entrepreneur at the initial stage of the entrepreneurial activity to succeed and 
gain legitimacy, they would have to comply with the existing regulations related to opening 
and operating a business (McMullen et al. 2008). These regulations influence level of IE in 
a country.
Policymakers can also create regulations that can have a positive influence on nascent 
IE. For instance, policies such as ‘Open Door’ and ‘Go Global’ (Hoskisson et al. 2012, p. 
2) can be supportive for IE by providing them access to information about different coun-
tries along with networking opportunities and access to human and financial capital (Cui 
and Jiang 2010; Luo et al. 2010; Cumming et al. 2017; Cooper 2003). As nascent interna-
tional entrepreneurs take advantage of the friendly ‘Open Door’ policies and expand into 
a foreign market, they become less reliant on the home country regulations and can gain 
favorability in the foreign market since some foreign governments will reduce regulatory 
burden to attract foreign firms. OECD (2002) identified that countries tend to use fiscal and 
regulatory incentives to attract foreign firms. Fiscal incentives include subsidies, favorable 
tax rates, and regulatory incentives such as reduction or deviation from normal domestic 
standards. Based on this, we hypothesize that
Hypothesis 2 The home country’s burdensome regulatory environment is positively 
associated with home country nascent international entrepreneurship.
2.5  Corruption, regulations, and nascent international entrepreneurship
Corruption and regulatory environment of a society are important determinants for the 
level nascent IE of the home country since context influences the entrepreneurs’ decision-
making process. “Grease in the wheels of commerce” theory of corruption suggests that in 
burdensome regulatory environment corruption can help to avoid impediments imposed 
by inefficient regulations and increase efficiency (Méon and Weill 2010; Méon and Sekkat 
2005).
Corruption and regulatory environment can have a bidirectional relationship. Djankov 
et  al. (2002) study illustrate that corruption and regulations are positively correlated. 
Another study by World Bank (2003) concluded that heavier regulations are associated 
with facilitating corruption, weakening rule of law, and government inefficiency. Djankov 
et al. (2002) study found that the number of procedures required to register a business is 
much less in developed countries such as Canada than in the developing countries. The 
regulatory environment can impose a financial burden or an administrative burden that 
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can cause delays. While financial burden may incite nascent IEs to use their financial 
resources to engage in corruption administrative related regulations may lessen that urge 
as suggested by Barro, “In some circumstances, corruption may be preferable to honest 
enforcement of bad rules. For example, outcomes may be worse if a regulation that prohib-
its some useful economic activity is thoroughly enforced rather than circumvented through 
bribes” (Barro 2000, p. 36). Besides, entrepreneurs positioned in the corrupt environment 
may have expectation built-in that he/she would have to take on challenges associated with 
corruption, in another word, entrepreneurs have taken costs and uncertainty already in the 
cost/benefit calculation. In this situation, even though corruption adds a burden but the 
benefit of avoiding the burdensome regulations outweighs the cost of corruption, making 
corruption an attractive mechanism.
Access to information can be another motivation for nascent international entrepreneurs 
to use corruption to their advantage. Information asymmetry exists between bureaucrats 
and entrepreneurs, and this information could be useful for nascent IEs. Nascent interna-
tional entrepreneurs that have political, social, and financial resources can use corruption 
to gain valuable information from these bureaucrats (Lawton et al. 2014). For those who 
do not have the extensive political capital or social resources,3 corruption enables them 
to “buy-in” quickly and early on, and to start building resources and gain access to policy 
influence, discretionary information, and other resources in the long run. This suggests 
that corruption could benefit nascent IE not only by reducing inefficiency associated with 
extensive regulations (Méon and Sekkat 2005) but by facilitating access in other ways. 
Nascent international entrepreneurs can also gain access to bureaucrats to reduce costs by 
using bureaucrats to use their power to facilitate transactions (Jain 2001) as suggested by 
Chafuen and Guzman (2000, p. 53) observe that “corruption is the cost of obtaining privi-
leges that only the States can ‘legally’ grant, such as favoritism in taxation, tariffs, sub-
sidies, loans, government contracting, and regulation” thus corruption could help IE in a 
country. We thus hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3 The positive relationship between regulations and home country nascent 
international entrepreneurship will be strengthened by corruption.
3  Data and method
3.1  Data sources
We constructed our sample by matching data from the following sources: Global Entre-
preneurship Monitor (GEM), World Development Indicators, Doing Business Database, 
World Governance Indicators, and KPMG. Our dependent variable, nascent international 
entrepreneurship, comes from GEM, a comparative cross-national database led by London 
Business School and Babson College, comprising multiple national teams around the world 
(Estrin et al. 2013; Reynolds et al. 2003). GEM interviews around 2000 individuals in each 
3 According to the resource-based view perspective, resources are valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate 
(Barney 1991). Political capital is a specific type of social capital and an important resource that incum-
bent and established firms developed through political affiliations and informal ties over an extended period. 
They can use this resource to access information from policy makers (Barney 1991). New firms often lack 
this important resource.
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country. The dataset includes both developed and developing countries. Our explanatory 
and control variables come from the other datasets mentioned above (World Development 
Indicator, doingbusiness.org, etc.). Our final dataset is an unbalanced panel data with 54 
countries, 171 observations during the period 2005–2011. Table 1 shows the list of coun-
tries included in this study.
3.2  Dependent variables
We use three measures for our dependent variable, nascent international entrepreneurship, 
taken from GEM. Nascent international entrepreneurs are a subsample of the total early-
stage entrepreneurial activity (TEA), defined as the percentage of the 18–64 population 
who are either a nascent entrepreneur or owner-manager of a new business that is more 
than 3 months old, but not more than 42 months (Reynolds et al. 2003; McMullen et al. 
2008). We aggregated individual data to the country level. Interviewees were asked “what 
percentage of their customers come from other countries: 1–25%, 26–75%, and 76–100%. 
We categorized the responses into three categories: Small, medium, and large IEs. Small 
nascent international entrepreneurship is measured as a percentage (0 to 100) of entrepre-
neurial activity (TEA) that indicate that 1–25% of their customers that live abroad. Medium 
nascent international entrepreneurship is measured as a percentage of early-stage ventures 
with 26–75% of customers that live abroad. Large nascent international entrepreneurship 
is measured as a percentage of early-stage ventures with 76–100% of customers that live 
abroad (Hessels 2008). We used their natural logarithmic form.
3.3  Independent variables
Our independent variables came from Doing Business, KPMG, and World Governance 
Indicators (Djankov et  al. 2002; Kaufmann et  al. 2009). We used corporate tax, cost of 
export, time to export, and documents required for export as proxies for the regulatory 
environment. Corporate taxes measured by the percentage of taxes on profit paid by the 
business as a percentage of commercial profits obtained from both Doing Business and 
KPMG (Belitski et  al. 2016). Cost of export is the cost associated with all procedures 
required to export goods and is measured as US dollar per container, time to export reflects 
the time necessary to comply with all export-related procedures and is measured as days, 
documents for export reflects the number of documents required per shipment to export 
goods. All three of these measures are taken from the Doing Business dataset. We used 
corruption as an indicator of institutional quality. All regulatory environment variables are 
taken with a 1-year lag to avoid issues of endogeneity between the regulatory environment 
and nascent international entrepreneurship.
Corruption measures were collected from three different sources—World Governance 
Indicator (WGI), ‘Corruption Perception Index’ (CPI) by Transparency International, and 
Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) by Heritage Foundation. World Governance Indicators 
reflect the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private inter-
ests (Kaufmann et al. 2009). Corruption is calculated by averaging data from 32 existing 
data sources. Data sources include surveys of households and firms, commercial business 
information providers, non-governmental information providers, and public-sector organi-
zations. The original score for the indicator ranges from − 2.5 to 2.5 (Kaufmann et  al. 
2009). For convenience, we reversed the order by multiply by − 1, where 2.5 corresponds 
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Table 1  List of countries and average of corruption and regulations (2005–2011) Source: World governance 
indicator, doing business database
Country name Years 
included in 
Study





Tax rate Cost to export 
(US$ per 
container)
Argentina 5 0.43 6.00 14.50 109.36 1402.50
Australia 2 − 2.04 7.00 9.00 50.71 1018.33
Austria 1 − 1.83 4.00 9.50 55.33 1025.67
Belgium 5 − 1.38 4.00 9.00 60.11 1230.50
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
4 0.32 7.67 19.50 38.91 1147.50
Chile 5 − 1.41 5.00 17.00 25.59 695.00
China 3 0.57 5.67 21.33 75.21 438.33
Colombia 5 0.24 6.00 22.33 80.80 1793.33
Croatia 5 − 0.02 7.00 22.33 33.20 1240.50
Czech Republic 1 − 0.31 6.00 17.50 49.10 965.00
Denmark 5 − 2.46 3.00 6.00 31.79 723.50
Ecuador 1 0.82 6.50 21.00 35.13 1327.50
Egypt 2 0.60 10.17 17.00 47.86 804.83
Finland 5 − 2.36 5.00 9.00 47.30 522.50
France 5 − 1.43 4.83 12.17 66.14 1260.00
Greece 1 − 0.11 6.00 20.00 51.20 1000.50
Hong Kong 2 − 1.89 3.83 8.17 24.61 558.33
Hungary 5 − 0.44 6.00 16.00 56.77 999.17
Iceland 4 − 2.18 4.00 11.33 26.97 1330.00
India 2 0.43 11.00 20.50 71.71 915.50
Ireland 4 − 1.69 2.00 8.00 26.30 1099.50
Italy 4 − 0.23 3.00 20.00 73.74 1276.33
Jamaica 3 0.41 7.33 19.83 51.27 1410.00
Japan 5 − 1.36 5.00 11.00 53.41 862.50
Jordan 1 − 0.25 7.83 19.33 31.23 727.50
Kazakhstan 1 0.94 12.83 86.00 39.33 2867.50
Korea (South) 4 − 0.44 5.67 10.83 32.44 767.33
Latvia 5 − 0.20 5.67 12.50 38.29 605.00
Macedonia 2 0.22 8.50 15.00 21.89 1252.83
Malaysia 3 − 0.14 4.00 13.00 35.09 441.00
Mexico 3 0.30 4.00 12.83 50.24 1378.33
Montenegro 1 0.27 5.80 14.00 31.52 888.00
Netherlands 5 − 2.13 5.00 7.00 43.71 917.50
Norway 5 − 2.03 5.00 8.00 42.41 861.50
Pakistan 1 0.93 8.00 23.33 38.11 643.17
Panama 2 0.32 3.00 10.00 49.63 495.50
Peru 2 0.27 7.00 20.17 41.03 717.50
Poland 1 − 0.32 4.00 17.00 43.57 859.00
Portugal 3 − 1.02 4.00 16.67 44.57 677.50
Russia 4 0.97 12.00 24.00 53.50 1903.33
Saudi Arabia 2 0.13 7.33 15.67 14.59 715.17
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to high corruption and − 2.5 corresponds to low corruption. We also reversed the order 
for both the Transparency International’s ‘Corruption Perception Index’ (CPI) and Her-
itage Foundation’s IEF’s corruption measures. Higher scores in these measures reflect a 
high level of corruption and lower scores mean low corruption (McMullen et al. 2008). All 
three measures of corruption are highly correlated, ranging from 0.96 to 0.97, suggesting 
that each conceptualization of corruption is quite consistent with the others.4
3.4  Control variables
To account for the economic development of a country, we use GDP per capita data from 
the World Development Indicator. Economic development is measured as GDP per capita 
for the country (Carree et al. 2002). This is important because the level of development can 
increase entrepreneurial activity in a country. Higher levels of income and economic devel-
opment could lead to demand for market expansion and more opportunity, and potential 
entrepreneurs will decide to act. Human capital is measured by the tertiary school gross 
enrollment ratio and reflects the quality of labor international entrepreneurs may be able to 
access (Fritsch and Schroeter 2011). Countries with a higher level of human capital tend 
to exhibit more entrepreneurial activity (Davidsson and Honig 2003). Economic openness 
reflects the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a share of gross domestic 
product (McMullen et  al. 2008). Countries with open trade policies likely to have more 
entrepreneurial activity (McMullen et  al. 2008). The manufacturing sector refers to the 
a The inverted score for the indicator ranges from negative 2.5—no corruption to positive 2.5—severe cor-
ruption (Kaufmann et al. 2009)
Table 1  (continued)
Country name Years 
included in 
Study





Tax rate Cost to export 
(US$ per 
container)
Slovak Republic 1 − 0.31 6.00 20.83 48.90 1244.17
Slovenia 5 − 0.94 7.00 19.83 38.31 962.17
Spain 5 − 1.08 4.83 10.00 59.77 1143.83
Sweden 3 − 2.22 3.00 9.00 54.74 649.00
Switzerland 4 − 2.11 4.00 8.00 28.89 1387.50
Thailand 2 0.30 8.00 17.83 37.91 697.67
Tunisia 2 0.13 6.00 14.67 60.97 719.83
Turkey 3 − 0.04 9.67 15.67 47.40 868.50
Uganda 2 0.84 13.33 35.33 35.80 2350.00
United Kingdom 5 − 1.69 4.00 9.67 35.90 1021.67
United States of 
America
4 − 1.34 5.00 6.00 46.07 995.00
Uruguay 5 − 1.15 7.00 20.50 52.71 1012.50
Venezuela 1 1.08 10.17 43.00 54.19 1870.00
4 Data was not available for all the countries every year. We calculated the mean from the available years 
and used it to replace the missing values (Kim and Li 2014).
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net output produced by all producers as a percent of GDP. All measures are taken from 
the World Development Indicators. To account for the overall business environment of the 
country, we have included insolvency cost, defined as measured as the cost to close a busi-
ness (Klapper et al. 2006), and taken from the Doing Business database. Government size 
is measured by government expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Expenditures include 
both consumption and transfers. Data are taken from the Economic Freedom Index, as with 
McMullen et al. (2008). Table 2 presents variables and sources in greater detail.
Descriptive statistics and correlations of all the variables are reported in Table 3. All 
three corruption measures are highly correlated: Corruption-WGI and Corruption-TI have 
a correlation of 0.97 and Corruption-IEF and Corruption-WGI have a correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.97. These high correlations reflect the external validity of these measures. Docu-
ments required for export and time required are correlated at 0.64, suggesting extensive 
documentation requirements are associated with delayed processing and extended wait for 
trade-related activity. Document requirements for export and all three corruption measures 
have correlations between 0.63 to 0.65, and time to export and all three corruption meas-
ures have correlations from 0.58 to 0.61.
3.5  Empirical strategy
We use the following econometric model to test our hypotheses with panel data:
where it is nascent IE (Small international entrepreneurship, medium international entre-
preneurship, large international entrepreneurship) in a given country i at time t, β and 
k are parameters to be estimated,  xit−1 is a vector of independent explanatory variables 
including corruption and regulatory measures and  zit is a vector of strictly exogenous con-
trol variables. Our panel data application utilizes a one-way error component model for the 
disturbances, with
where 휇i denotes the unobservable country-specific effect when we control for the time-
invariant part of unobserved heterogeneity in countries. We used country fixed effects 
regression with country clustered standard errors.
4  Results
Results related to direct effects are presented in Table  7 in Appendix. Table  4 presents 
results from the interactions related to corruption and regulations. All of our control vari-
ables show unsurprising results, with different degrees of significance. Human capital and 
economic openness are positively related to IE firms (Davidsson and Honig 2003; Carree 
et al. 2002). Government size and insolvency cost continue to be negatively related to nas-
cent IEs of all sizes as expected (McMullen et al. 2008).
In hypothesis 1, we predicted that corruption will have a positive relationship with IE. 
We find support for our hypothesis. In all the specifications, corruption is positively related 
to all IE and in some instances, it is significant (Specifications 2, 5, 14, and 15) (p < 0.05). 





, i = 1,… , N; t = 1,… , T
(2)ui,t = 휇i + 휀i,t
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suggesting corruption plays an important role in nascent IE. Besides, medium nascent IE 
have a stronger positive relationship with corruption than small and large nascent IE.
In hypothesis 2, we predicted that a complex regulatory environment will have a posi-
tive relationship with nascent IE. We find conflicting results. While regulations related to 
cost and time have a positive relationship with nascent IE. Regulations related to docu-
ment requirement does not have any significant relationship. We find partial support for 
our hypothesis. This result suggests that not all types of regulations have a similar effect on 
IEs, rather a nature of the regulation is an important component.
In hypothesis 3, we posited that corruption will have a stronger impact on the posi-
tive relationship between regulations that have financial implications and nascent interna-
tional entrepreneurship. In specifications 1, 2, and 3 we included the cost to export and the 
interaction with corruption for small, medium, and large nascent IE. The cost to export is 
not significant for any IE regardless of their size, but the interaction coefficient is nega-
tive and statistically significant (β = − 0.37, p < 0.01) for small IEs and consistent for the 
medium, and large IE (β = − 0.37, p < 0.01; β = − 0.40, p < 0.01, respectively) presented in 
specification 2 and 3, respectively. The results suggest that regulations that have financial 
implications combined with corruption become a burden on nascent IE regardless of their 
size. On the other hand, regulations such as the time required for export is positive but not 
significant for nascent IE firms of any size. However, when we interacted corruption with 
the time required for export, it becomes negative and not significant for small and medium 
types of IEs (specifications 4, 5)and significant only for large IE (β = − 0.02, p < 0.05; 
specification 6). Regulations related to the documentation requirement is not significant for 
all nascent IEs. The results demonstrate the differential impact of regulations on different 
types of nascent IEs.
Concerning corporate taxes, it has a consistently negative impact on all IEs with vari-
ous degrees of significance. The relationship is significant for medium and large IEs 
(β = − 0.01, p < 0.01; β = − 0.01, p < 0.01, respectively). When we interact with corporate 
tax rates with corruption, the relationship becomes not significant, but the negative rela-
tionship persists (Specifications 10, 11, 12). The result suggest that tax related regulations 
are not a significant factor for international entrepreneurs. Specifications 13, 14, and 15 
present the results of the full model. The interaction of cost to export and corruption is 
negative and statistically significant for all three types of nascent IE (β = − 0.29 to − 0.37, 
p < 0.01). The results reflect the added cost of corruption and confirm the ‘sanding’ effect 
of corruption (Anokhin and Schulze 2009).
Our original results for the cost of export and corporate tax remain negative for all three 
types of IE firms. The original results for the cost of export and corporate tax remain nega-
tive. Concerning taxes and corruption, the result is only significant for small IE (β = − 0.10, 
p < 0.05). We find partial support for our hypothesis 3 that the benefit of corruption 
depends on the types of regulations and the size of the nascent IE. While small nascent IE 
are negatively affected by the home country corruption, medium and large nascent IEs ben-
efit from corruption depending on the types of regulations.
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5  Robustness analysis
We used two additional corruption measures from the Index of Economic Freedom 
(Table 5) and another measure of the corporate tax rate from KPMG (Table 6), for robust-
ness checks. We have also run a regression using Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) measure. The results are included in Table 8 in Appendix.
In Table 5, similar to the original analysis, all the variables are lagged 1 year. Hypoth-
esis 1 is supported, as the coefficient of interest (corruption) is positive in all cases with 
varying degrees of significance and some cases not statistically significant. We found par-
tial support for Hypothesis 2, similar to previous results, interestingly, export regulation 
measures become significant and the corporate tax rate is not significant.
The interactions of corruption and costs associated with exports continue to have a signifi-
cant negative relationship with all nascent IE firms, regardless of the size. Like the previous 
results, the time to export and export procedures have no significant effect on small and medium 
nascent IEs. The interaction between time to export and corruption is significant for large nas-
cent IEs (β = − 0.001, p < 0.05). In specification 13–15 we present results for the full models. 
Export costs and corruption interaction have a negative relationship with all nascent IEs.
The results from a robustness check using KPMG tax data are reported in Table 6. The cor-
porate tax rate is a concern for all nascent IEs. The specifications 13–15 in Table 6 presents 
results for KPMG corporate tax data for all size nascent IEs. These IEs continue to have a nega-
tive relationship with corporate tax (β = − 0.04, p < 0.01). In Table 4, a result related to corpo-
rate tax, corruption, and small IEs was negative but not significant, but it is negative and signifi-
cant using the KPMG tax measure. Results hold consistent in the full model for other measures.
Results in Table  6 for the cost of exports, corruption, and IE remain similar to previous 
results, still supporting Hypothesis 3 that corruption can be an added cost for nascent IEs. Results 
related to time requirements, tax rates, and corruption are also consistent with previous results.
6  Discussion and conclusions
Policymakers and scholars have an interest in measuring international entrepreneurship within a 
country. This paper advances the discussion related to the level of international entrepreneurship 
activity in a country by investigating its relationship with corruption and regulatory measures 
within a country. Our results underscore the variance between types of regulations and IE level 
in a country. We examined how regulatory institutions (specifically export and tax regulations) 
and corruption can directly and jointly influence nascent international entrepreneurs in the home 
country. In hypothesis 1, we posited that corruption will have a positive relationship with the 
home country nascent international entrepreneurship and we find support for our hypothesis. 
Concerning our hypothesis 2, we find that not all regulations have a similar impact on nascent 
home country international entrepreneurship. Regulations that have financial implications have a 
stronger effect than the regulations with no financial implications. Time and cost-related regula-
tions are important since they put the financial burden. In hypothesis 3, we predicted that corrup-
tion will strengthen the positive relationship between home country regulatory environment and 
home country nascent international entrepreneurship. We find partial support for our hypothesis; 
the results of this study suggest that the combination of regulations that have financial implica-
tions, corruption of home country can have a detrimental impact on the home country’s nascent 
international entrepreneurship. Our results indicate that regulations and corruption have a more 
nuanced relationship with nascent IEs in the home country.
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Our results show a more complicated relationship between nascent IEs, corruption, 
and regulations. The negative relationship between cost-related regulations, corruption, 
and nascent IEs suggest that cost–benefit analysis between investment in the venture and 
quality of government can have important implications for the nascent IEs in a country. 
Our results related to tax rate and corrption suggest that IE is not influenced by the tax 
rate in a high corrupt country. The result might reflect implications for trust on govern-
ment. In a corrupt country, trust in the government can be limited to none. This lack 
of trust in government in turn leads to legitimacy problem for the government or gov-
ernment officials. Trust and legitimacy help governments to establish social norms and 
boundaries. Trust in government is also important in establishing government effective-
ness that the tax payers’ funds will be used appropriately. These norms, boundaries, and 
government effectiveness create a predictable environment for entrepreneurs. Therefore, 
if the goal for the policymakers is to promote international entrepreneurial activity in a 
country, then the investment should be made to create such an environment.
Researchers and policymakers have considerable interest in increasing entrepreneurship. 
They continuously examine the role of institutions that influences a wide variety of eco-
nomic activities. The result of the article might shed light on the question of “how, why, 
and when do entrepreneurial firms discover and exploit opportunities outside their home 
country?” (Zahra and Garvis 2000). Future studies may also explore how the relationship 
between regulatory environment, corruption, and nascent IEs change as a country transitions 
through various stages of development such as factor- and efficiency-driven stages as these 
relationships can be an important and decisive factor in these economies.
6.1  Managerial Implications
The results of our study have implications are both policymakers and firm managers. Policy-
makers are interested in adopting policies that generate entrepreneurial activity while entre-
preneurs are interested in creating and sustaining their businesses. Both parties can work 
together to create an environment beneficial for both parties. Since entrepreneurs tend to 
lack the necessary political capital and financial resources to effectively engage in the politi-
cal environment, policymakers may adapt venues that allow entrepreneurs to engage more 
effectively in the political environment and maintain the venture’s resources.
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